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Abstract
The present study investigates the effects of current pay, market
surveys, job evaluation points, job gender, and rater sex on pay rates for
jobs. 400 compensation administrators assigned new pay rates to nine jobs
in one of two matched job sets: either all predominantly female, or all
predominantly male. The two sets were matched on all quantitative data
(current rate, market rate, and job evaluation points), but varied in terms
of job titles and descriptions. Multiple analyses of variance and regression
analyses were performed to determine whether job gender had a significant
effect on assigned pay rates, holding other factors constant. Regardless
of the analysis employed, no evidence of gender bias was found. Limitations
and suggestions for future research are offered.
Job Pay 3
During the past two decades, considerable attention has been focused
on the earnings gap between men and women. Early research attempted to
explain this gap as a function of individual differences in human capital
characteristics (see Milkovich, 1980). Individual earnings of men and women
were regressed on such variables as education and work experience to determine
how much of the pay differential could be attributed to gender differences
in human capital acquisition. The unexplained part of the differential,
or residual, was then attributed to "discrimination."
Unfortunately, most of these early studies used only crude measures
(if any) of the different jobs held by men and women. However, as individual
earnings equations began to incorporate better measures of the jobs held
by men and women (e.g., Gerhart & Milkovich, 1987; Rosenbaum, 1985), they
were able to explain a significantly larger proportion of the earnings gap.
It has now become clear that the major source of the earnings gap is
not differential compensation for men and women doing the same work, but
rather the segregation of men and women into different jobs that are paid
differently (Treiman & Hartmann, 1981). Thus, the question arises as to
whether the different tasks that typify "men's work" and "women's work" are
compensated in a way that represents equal pay for equal contribution or
value added.
Consequently, recent research has focused more directly on the
determinants of compensation for jobs, rather than for individuals. For
example, researchers have considered the extent to which job analysis and
job evaluation procedures might lead to differential evaluations of the
"worth" of male-dominated versus female-dominated jobs. In particular, the
judgments of job analysts and job evaluators have been scrutinized for
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evidence of cognitive or evaluative biases that might lead to undervaluation
of female-dominated work (e.g., Arvey, 1986).
studies of this type seek to determine whether, holding other factors
constant, the gender composition of jobs influences perceptions of job worth
as assessed via job evaluation. Although these studies stop short of
examining job
~
decisions, they examine one of its common inputs: job
evaluation results (Belcher, 1974; Milkovich & Newman, 1987; Treiman &
Hartmann, 1981).
Findings from this research are decidedly mixed. Several studies have
found little evidence that gender composition influences job evaluation
outcomes. For example, Schwab and Grams (1985) found that sex composition,
manipulated via proportions of male or female incumbents embedded in a job
description, had no effect on either absolute or relative (to two other jobs)
job evaluation ratings in a sample of 103 compensation professionals. Similar
results were found for a college student sample (Grams & Schwab, 1985), with
the single exception that gender composition appeared to affect ratings on
the compensable factor "job complexity". Both studies did find, however,
that information about current market wages had a substantial impact on the
evaluation points assigned.
These studies led Grams and Schwab (1985) to conclude that there is
little evidence of direct gender bias in job evaluation. Howeve:r, the
possibility of "indirect" bias via knowledge of differential market pay for
men's and women's work did receive support.
Arvey, Passino and Lounsbury (1977) found that sex of the job incumbent
(as manipulated by photographs and voices of alleged "incumbents") had no
effect on job analysis results using the Position Analysis Questionnaire
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(PAQ). However, as Grams and Schwab (1985) note, it is unclear whether
subjects responded to tne jobs per se or to the individuals performing them.
Doverspike and Barrett (1984) obtained job evaluation scores for 105
male-dominated and 105 female-dominated jobs using a IS-scale Comprehensive
Job Evaluation Technique. Results suggested that although particular scales
appeared to be biased either for or against female-dominated jobs, as a whole
the job evaluation instrument differentiated male and fernale- dominated jobs
equally well.
On the other hand, Mahoney and Blake (1979 & 1987) reported that the
perceived femininity of 20 well-known occupations accounted for a significant
proportion of variance in assigned salaries, controlling for the effects
of perceived job requirements. However, the authors acknowledge two potential
difficulties with their results (see also Grams & Schwab, 1985). First,
given a correlation of .83 between assigned and actual salaries, subjects
may have assigned salaries on the basis of "what is" rather than "what should
be". Second, it is possible that the inclusion of the "perceived
masculinity/femininity" item sensitized subjects to gender issues and thus
triggered sexual stereotypes that might not otherwise have occurred.
In contrast, a marginally significant job evaluation point differential
in favor of female-typed jobs was reported by Mount and Ellis (1987) for
two jobs with identical descriptions but different, sex-typed titles (orderly
vs. nurse's aide; YMCA vs. YWCA recreation director). A potential weakness
of this study, however, is that the subjects (52 job evaluators responsible
for implementing comparable worth) had received extensive training in job
evaluation and pay discrimination. Thus, subjects may have "bent over
backwards" not to slight jobs that appeared to be female-dominated.
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A number of potential explanations exist for these differences across
studies. For example, subjects have ranged from naive students to experienced
job evaluators with substantial comparable worth training. Sex composition
has been manipulated in a variety of ways (job titles, incumbent photographs
and voices, explicit provision of gender information), some of which are
likely to present stronger demand characteristics than others (Mount & Ellis,
1987). Some studies have looked at a single job, others at sets of jobs.
Finally, gender manipulations have been embedded in designs encompassing
a variety of other independent variables (e.g., job descriptions, current
pay rates).
Given the importance of the issue and the ambiguity of previous results,
several authors have called for additional scrutiny of job evaluation as
a measurement process. For example, Arvey (198G), McArthur (1985), and
Treiman (1979) suggest additional investigation of the various points at
which cognitive biases might enter into judgments of job worth (e.g.,
differential perception or attention in job description, analysis, and
evaluation). Additionally, Doverspike and Barrett (1984) and Treiman and
Hartmann (1981) point to the potential importance of the properties of the
job evaluation instrument (e.g., choice of compensable factors, factor
anchors, and factor weights).
Although further job evaluation research is surely to be encouraged,
it must nevertheless be remembered that job evaluation is only one of many
factors that determine job pay (e.g., Schwab, 1980 & 1985). A review of
basic compensation literature reveals that job pay is based on some
combination of past pay relationships, market surveys, collective bargaining,
individual negotiation, supply and demand characteristics, compensation
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strategies, and job evaluation (e.g., Belcher, 1974; Milkovich & Newman,
1987; Patten, 1977). Indeed, some argue that job evaluation serves primarily
to "capture" or model these other factors, particularly market wages (e.g.,
Fox, 1962; Livernash, 1957; McCormick, 1981; Schwab, 1980). Moreover,
although job evaluation is a common practice in large organizations, its
use is by no means universal (Mahoney, Rosen & Rynes, 1984).
Anecdotal evidence also points to the importance of factors other than
job evaluation in determining job pay. -For example, an examination of
comparable worth-related litigation reveals that where market survey and
job evaluation results conflict, judges tend to view market estimates as
more "objective" and compelling (e.g., Spaulding v. University of Washington
(1984), Christensen v. State of Iowa (1977), Lemons v. City and County of
Denver (1980), American Nurses Assn. v. State of Illinois (1985), State of
Washington v. AFSCME (1985). In addition, a recent compensation roundtable
concluded that economic conditions are causing external comparisons to become
more, rather than less, important in determining job pay (Levine, 1987).
Even more compelling are recent studies suggesting that the possession
of information about current pay rates may influence job evaluation outcomes
(e.g., Grams & Schwab, 1985; Mount & Ellis, 1987; Schwab & Grams, 1985).
To the extent that these results generalize, it would appear that current
pay can have both a direct effect (via market surveys) and an indirect effect
(via assigned job evaluation points) on job pay.
The pervasive role of current pay as a determinant of future pay suggests
that any comprehensive effort to understand job pay determination must
incorporate market, as well as job evaluation, information. At least two
recent studies have made advances in this direction.
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Based on the "cobweb theory" of wage fluctuations (e.g., Freeman, 1975),
Johnson and Ash (1986) developed a proxy measure for relative changes in
labor supply and demand for 55 occupations over a six-year time period.'
When added to measures of job content (as assessed via the Position Analysis
Questionnaire), this labor market variable explained significant additional
variance in wages over the six-year period. Moreover, the variance explained
by the market variable appeared to be largely independent of the sex
composition of the jobs studied.
Doverspike, Racicot and Hauenstein (1987) conducted three policy-
capturing studies to examine the joint impact of job grade and market pay
rate for nine hypothetical jobs in a large midwestern city. In each study,
job grade was found to have a larger impact than market rate on subjects'
minimal salary recommendations. However, no information was presented as
to the particular grades and market rates presented, or to their correlation.
Thus, no conclusions can be drawn as to the likely generalizability of their
findings, as the levels, ranges, and intercorrelations of independent
variables have been found to have a substantial impact on relative proportions
of variance explained in policy-capturing research (e.g., Rynes, Schwab &
Heneman, 1983).
The present study extends previous research by examining how compensation
administrators assign pay to jobs in the face of multiple, and sometimes
conflicting, pieces of information about job worth (current salary, market
rate, and job evaluation points). In addition, it examines whether the same
"rules" are applied in assigning pay to male-dominated versus female-
dominated jobs. This is accomplished by having each subject evaluate only
one of two sets of job descriptions (either predominantly female or
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predominantly male), holding quantitative job worth information constant
(i.e., current pay, market rate, job evaluation points). Thus, the present
study adds to previous research by examining the effects of job gender in
the context of both market and job evaluation information.
In light of previous recommendations that job evaluation committees
include equivalent numbers of men and women (e.g., Treiman & Hartmann, 1981),
the study also examines the impact of rater sex on pay assignments.
Additional support for examining this variable comes from research suggesting
that sex may have an impact on perceptions of appropriate pecuniary rewards
(e.g., Huber, 1988; Major & Konar, 1984). It should be noted that not all
studies have found rater sex effects, however (e.g., Grams & Schwab, 1985;
Mahoney & Blake, 1987).
The study incorporates a number of other previously recommended feature~
as well (e.g., Arvey, 1986; McArthur, 1985; Hartmann, 1985). For example,
subjects are professional compensation administrators rather than convenience
samples of inexperienced college students. Moreover, these administrators
are drawn from a wide variety of public and private sector organizations.
Because surprisingly large pay differentials exist across organizations (e.g.,
Dunlop, 1957; Hay Group, Inc., 1984; Treiman & Hartmann, 1981), it is
important that pay research include subjects from a broad range of
organizations.
The present study also disentangles the effects of market wages and
job evaluation points on pay determination. This was accomplished by creating
orthogonal job evaluation and market rate manipulations. In contrast,
analogous field research has been hampered by high intercorrelations
(typically .6 to .8) between salaries and job evaluation points (see Remick,
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1981), which impede the ability to unambiguously attribute pay differentials
to specific sources (Rynes, Schwab & Heneman, 1983).
Finally, the job data are based on a real-world comparable worth study
(State of Washington) that has attracted considerable attention in the
academic, legal and popular presses (Remick, 1981; Ehrenberg & Smith, 1987;
State of Washington v. AFSCME, 1985; Treiman & Hartman, 1981).
In line with the bulk of previous research regarding job evaluation
and job pay determinants (e.g., Arvey et al., 1977; Grams & Schwab, 1985;
Johnson & Ash, 1986; Schwab & Grams, 1985), no differences in pay assignments
are expected on the basis of either job gender or rater sex. On the other
hand, it is expected that assigned pay rates will exhibit significant
relationships with all three quantitative measures of "worth" (current pay,
market rate, job evaluation points).
Although it is not the primary focus of the present research, we further
predict that market variables (current pay and market rate) will explain
more variance in assigned pay than will job evaluation points. This is
expected due to anecdotal evidence that market rates and historical
relationships are given higher priority in establishing job pay, as well
as the greater standardization and familiarity of monetary units (dollars)
relative to job evaluation units ("worth" points). Although this prediction
is not consistent with Doverspike et al. (1987), numerous potential
explanations exist for their results (e.g., low variability in market rate




The initial sample consisted of 2000 randomly selected members of the
American Compensation Association. This original list was reduced to 1324
by excluding all members with addresses outside the continental United States,
duplicate individuals from a single organizational location, compensation
consultants, and a holdout sample of 125 for pretesting and manipulation
checks. Four hundred fifty questionnaires were returned, for a response
rate of 34%. However, missing data resulted in an effective sample size
of 406 for most analyses.
Respondents were almost equally divided by sex (53% male, 46% female,
1 % unknown). The average age of respondents was 38, average time in current
organization was 5.3 years, and average total compensation experience was
8.6 years. Respondents were virtually identical to the original sample in
terms of sex composition; however, a higher proportion of respondents than
nonrespondents were from the public sector (13% v. 6%).
Design and Procedures
In order to examine whether the same "rules" are used in determining
pay for male- versus female-dominated jobs, each subject received a
questionnaire containing one of two job sets: either predominantly female
or predominantly male. Jobs in each set had previously been identified as
at least 70% female-dominated, or 70% male-dominated, by the State of
Washington comparable worth study (Remick, 1981). Across the two sets, all
quantitative data (current pay, market rate, job evaluation points) were
identically matched and thereby held constant.
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To insure that the quantitative information would be equally credible
in both the male- and female-dominated job sets, each "male" job was matched
with a "female" job on the basis of actual pay rates in the state of
Washington study (e.g., Remick, 1981; Ehrenberg & Smith, 1987). Thus, for
example, the Administrative Services Manager (female) was paired with the
Maintenance Mechanic II (male) because their salaries varied by less than
$5 per week.
Although state of Washington pay rates are admittedly not perfect
proxies for national market averages, Washington's salaries were based on
market surveys that included pay information from other states. Moreover,
because considerable pay variability exists for the same job across
industries, organizations, and regions (e.g., Hay Group, 1984; Rynes &
Milkovich, 1986), it is unlikely that small deviations from national averages
would cause data based on Washington's salaries to appear implausible to
compensation administrators. Furthermore, our pay figures need not be perfect
estimates of national averages; rather, it is only necessary that they be
realistic enough that compensation administrators perceive the data as
credible in making their pay determinations. Finally, these assumptions
were checked via two pretests, which revealed no problems with the credibility
of the pay manipulations.
Although it is also possible that relative market wages for paired jobs
diverged somewhat between the Washington comparable worth study and 1986,
occupational differentials have been shown to be surprisingly consistent
over time. For example, a regression of 1985 median weekly earnings on 1975
earnings in seven of the occupational categories covered in this study
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resulted in an adjusted R2 of .98 (data taken from U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1980 and U.S. Department of Labor, 1987).
Originally, 32 jobs (16 male, 16 female) were selected for the research.
However, on the basis of two pretests (N = 15 each), a decision was made
to retain only 18 jobs (9 pairs) in the final research. This was done
primarily to reduce the time required to complete the questionnaire and,
hopefully, to thereby increase the response rate.
For generalizability purposes, jobs were chosen with an eye to including
as wide a salary range as possible (see Rynes et al., 1983). This was
somewhat difficult, however, as there were few low-paying male jobs to match
with the lowest-paying female jobs. A similar problem occurred at the high-
paying end, where there were few well-paid female jobs to match with roale-
dominated ones. The final job sets included a range of monthly salaries
(inflated to 1986 levels) from $1200 to $2190.
Manipulations. To determine the impact of market surveys and job
evaluation points on job pay, over and above the impact of current pay, market
survey results and job evaluation point results were orthogonally manipulated
in relation to current pay. This design was accomplished in several stages.
First, for each job pair (e.g., Administrative Services Manager and
Maintenance Mechanic II), a current pay rate was derived from the average
of the two rates. (On average, salaries for the matched jobs differed by
$20 per month). This average was then rounded to the nearest $10. The
resultant figure was then inflated to 1986 levels using percent changes in
average earnings (as reported in Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1985, and
Commerce Clearing House, 1986).
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Next, market survey and job evaluation manipulations were created and
then crossed to produce an orthogonal 3 x 3 matrix. This was accomplished
in several steps. First, three levels of market rates were defined: 6% below
current rate, no change from current rate (although rates were actually
manipulated +j- 1% or 2% to avoid identical figures for market rate and
current pay), and 6% above current rate. Then, three of the job pairs were
(randomly) assigned market rates that were 6% below their current rates,
three had market rates 1% or 2% below or above current rate, and three had
rates 6% above. Note that each of the market rates produced by this procedure
is uniquely linked to a single job pair, as the nine market rates are derived
from the nine original salary figures.
The job evaluation manipulation was similarly constructed, but in two
steps. First, baseline job evaluation points were created by multiplying
the current pay rate by a factor of .4. This created a set of job evaluation
scores that were precisely co-linear with current rates, but on a different
scale to avoid subject detection of the manipulation. Then, job evaluation
levels were created in an identical manner to the market rate manipulation:
6% lower than baseline, no change, and 6% higher than the job evaluation
base. Finally, each of these three manipulation levels was randomly assigned
to three jobs, in such a way as to create the 3 x 3 orthogonal design
reflected in the last two columns of Table 1.
Insert Table 1 about here
A final manipulation involved the order in which administrators received
information about market survey rates and job evaluation points. Half the
administrators received market information first, the other half, job
evaluation first. Thus, there were four different versions of the
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questionnaire: (1) male job set/market rate first; (2) male job set/job
evaluation first; (3) female job set/market first; and (4) female job set/job
evaluation first.
In summary, then, each subject assigned new pay rates to a set of nine
jobs. However, any given subject evaluated only male-dominated, or female-
dominated, jobs. Thus, the final design encompassed two between-subject
manipulations (order and job gender), one non-manipulated between-subjects
factor (rater sex), and two within-subject, repeated measures factors (job
evaluation points and market rates) which were both generated from current
pay rates.
Administration. Each subject received a booklet of 9 jobs, all of
which were either predominantly male or predominantly female. For each job,
participants were given: (1) the job title (taken from the Washington study),
(2) a brief job description (taken primarily from the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles, U.S. Department of Labor, 1977, with occasional
supplementation from the Occupational outlook Handbook, U.S. Department of
Labor, 1986, and a university job description manual), (3) the current pay
rate (1986 midpoint salary values for each matched job pair), (4) the
manipulated market survey rate, and (5) the manipulated job evaluation rate.
Their task was to assign a new pay midpoint to each of the 9 jobs.
In assigning new pay rates, subjects were instructed to use the same
criteria they would use in their own organizations. For example, if a
subject's organization placed greater weight on salary surveys than on job
evaluation, the subject was instructed to apply that same prioritization
scheme assigning new job rates. These instructions were verbally reinforced
via phone calls to each of the approximately 1300 questionnaire recipients.
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Manipulation Checks. Because no explicit information was given to
subjects regarding gender composition of the jobs, subsequent questionnaires
were sent to approximately 100 holdout sample members as a manipulation check
of job gender perceptions. Subjects were given a randomly ordered list of
the 18 job titles and descriptions, and asked to estimate the percentage
of male incumbents in each job category.
Results based on 34 respondents showed that, on average, the nine
predominantly female job categories were perceived to be 70% female.
Predominantly male jobs were perceived to be 86% male. The somewhat lower
average in the female set is attributable to the presence of four female-
dominated jobs that were perceived to have relatively high proportions (at
least 40%) of male incumbents: administrative services manager, editor,
statistical reports compiler, and employment interviewer.
Another way of examining these perceptions is to look at the differences
in "perceived maleness" between the two jobs in each job pair. This analysis
reveals an average difference of 56%, ranging from a low of 33% (for
maintenance mechanic versus administrative services manager) to a high of
83% (electrician versus registered industrial nurse).
Although it would have been preferable to have stronger perceptions
of "femaleness" for at least some of the the jobs, it should be noted that
our manipulation check represents a very conservative test of whether our
experimental subjects would have realized, if directly asked, that the 9-
job sets were either male- or female-dominated. Specifically, in the actual
experiment, subjects received nine jobs of one sex type, many of which are
clearly identifiable as female-dominated (e.g., clerk, secretary, nurse).
In contrast, the manipulation check presented both male- and female-dominated
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jobs, in random order. Had jobs been presented in single-sex sets, as was
the case in the actual experiment, estimated proportions would almost
certainly have revealed greater perceived gender-domination.
Also, it should be kept in mind that we did not want sex composition
to be a blatantly salient factor to experimental subjects, as we wished to
avoid flagging the comparable worth issue. Rather, our intention was to
see whether subtle gender-based differences emerge even when decision maker
attention is being focused only on current pay, job evaluation, and market
surveys.
Finally, it was possible to perform a number of empirical tests to
determine whether job pairs with weaker gender-identification (e.g., those
involving the editor or administrative services manager) yielded different
pay patterns from those with stronger gender identification (e.g., those
involving the secretary or nurse). These are elaborated in the third and
fourth analyses below.
Analyses
The principal research objective was to determine whether job gender
had an independent influence on the assignment of new pay rates. A secondary
objective was to determine the relative effect sizes of market versus job
evaluation information on pay assignments. In addition, there was interest
in determining whether rater sex or order of information presentation (market
first vs. job evaluation first) influenced pay assignments. These questions
were examined via four analyses, summarized in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 about here
In the first two analyses, the dependent variables were based on changes
between original (i.e., "current") rates and new job rates. The first
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analysis focused on absolute difference scores, the second on percentage
changes. Both analyses were performed because of differences of opinion
as to whether pay increase budgets should be allocated across jobs in terms
of (roughly) equal dollars, versus equal percentages (under percentage-based
allocations, highly paid jobs get relatively "richer", and poor jobs "poorer";
Belcher, 1974).
Independent variables were the same in both analyses. Specifically,
pay changes were examined as a function of: (a) between-subjects factors
(job gender, order of information, and rater sex) and (b) within-subject
factors (market rate and job evaluation point manipulations).
The third and fourth analyses used regression analyses to examine new
pay rates, as opposed to difference or change scores, as the dependent
variable. That is, rather than examining the differences between current
and new rates, the regressions looked at the new pay rate as a function of
the current rate, in conjunction with the previous independent variables
(i.e., market rate, job evaluation points, job gender, order, and rater sex).
In the third analysis, data from all subjects were combined in a between-
subjects analysis based on 3654 total observations (406 subjects, 9
observations each). To provide results in a format comparable to that from
the ANOVAs, both market rate and job evaluation manipulations were dummy
coded (one variable to reflect "up 6%11, one to reflect "down 6%", with the
"no change" conditions serving as the omitted categories).
Because each subject provides nine observations, this analysis poses
a potential problem in terms of correlated error terms. The effect of this
autocorrelation is to provide inefficient, but unbiased, estimates of
independent variable effects. Thus, although analyses with correlated error
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terms may make it difficult to demonstrate statistical significance (at least
with small sample sizes), they do not result in biased coefficients.
To get a better sense of the possible effects of the correlated error
terms, an additional regression was run that included a dummy variable for
each subject (see also Olson, Dell'Omo & Jarley, 1987). These dummies reflect
the propensity of each subject to assign relatively high (or low) pay rates
to the job set as a whole, and thus remove the variance due to idiosyncratic
subject decision rules.
Next, to assess the potential impact of differences in perceived gender-
dominance, three additional regressions were run. The first included a
variable reflecting the perceived "percent males" in each job, as estimated
by the subjects who responded to the manipulation check survey. The second
included a variable representing the difference in perceived maleness between
the male-dominated and female-dominated job in each job pair [e.g.,
electrician (95%) minus nurse (12%) = 83%). The third included this same
difference variable, but excluded the dummy reflecting the job gender set
(male- or female-dominated). Significance testing of these coefficients
provides a way of determining whether our results are affected by the
differential perceptions of gender-dominance across individual jobs and job
pairs.
In the fourth and final analysis, nine separate between-subjects
regressions (N = 406) were run, one for each job pair. Specifically, for
each pair, new pay rates were regressed on dummy variables reflecting job
gender (1 = female), order (1 = job evaluation first), and rater sex (1 =
female) and each of their interactions. This was done to see whether any
particular job pairs yielded idiosyncratic rate assignment patterns. Note
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that autocorrelation is not a problem in these analyses, as each subject
provides only one observation per regression.
Particular interest was focused on the possibility of significant effects
for job gender, since these might indicate potential problems with the
credibility of current pay figures for one, or both, jobs in specific job
matches. Additionally, taken as a set, these regressions provide additional
evidence as to whether results for job pairs with weaker perceived gender-
dominance (e.g., those involving the editor or administrative services
manager) reflect different patterns from those with stronger gender
differentiation (e.g.,registered nurse or secretary II). Specifically, if
gender dominance has an impact on pay assignments, one would expect stronger
gender effects for the pairs with greater gender differentiation (job pairs
1, 4, 6, 8 and 9) than for those with less clear differentiation (pairs 2,
3, 5 and 7).
Results
Because responses were not exactly proportional to the total surveys
mailed in terms of experimental conditions (i.e., male vs. female job set;
market rate presented first vs. job evaluation first), slightly unequal cell
sizes were obtained across the four conditions. However, these differences
were very small. Furthermore, correlational analysis based on contrast coding
revealed negligible relationships among the three between-subjects factors
(r = .07 between job gender and rater sex, .03 between job gender and order,
and -.03 between order and sex.) Consequently, all responses were retained
for subsequent analyses.
Results of the first two analyses (analysis of variance on raw difference
scores and percent change scores) are shown in Table 3. None of the between-
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subjects factors (job gender, order, rater sex) or their interactions were
significant in either analysis. Thus, as hypothesized, sources of variance
other than those signalling job worth do not appear to have contributed to
pay adjustments in any systematic fashion.
Insert Table 3 About Here
As hypothesized, within-subject analyses revealed significant main
effects for both the market rate and job evaluation manipulations. Also
consistent with our predictions, the size of the market effect was
substantially larger than the job evaluation effect. For example, in
Analysis 1, the squared canonical correlation for the market manipulation
(analogous to omega squared for a between-subjects factor) was .59, as opposed
to .15 for the job evaluation manipulation.
In addition, the market rate x job evaluation interaction was significant
in both analyses. Examination of cell means suggested that the nonlinear
effect was primarily concentrated in the job pair where both the market rate
and job evaluation points were 6% higher than baseline (secretary II and
security guard). This is illustrated in Table 4, which gives cell means
for Analysis 1.
Insert Table 4 about here
The market rate x job evaluation interaction is also reflected in two
3-way interactions. First, in both Analysis 1 and Analysis 2, there was
also a three-way interaction between market rate, job evaluation, and job
gender. Cell means suggested that there was a tendency to under-reward three
of the male-dominated jobs (equipment mechanic I, maintenance mechanic II,
and security guard) relative to their female-dominated counterparts (editor,
administrative services manager and secretary II). Second, in Analysis 2
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(but not 1), there was a three-way interaction between market rate, job
evaluation points, and rater sex. Cell means suggested that female
administrators had a greater tendency than males to underreward the job pair
where both market rate and job points were 6% above baseline (pair one;
secretary II and security guard).
Finally, both analyses revealed one more three-way interaction: JE x
JG x Order. Cell means suggested that male-dominated jobs with lower-than-
baseline job evaluation points (equipment mechanic I, revenue compliance
officer, and custodian) were underrewarded relative to their female-dominated
counterparts (editor, research librarian, and clerk typist II) when market
rates were presented first. However, this pattern did not hold for jobs
where evaluation points were either at baseline, or 6% above baseline.
The third set of analyses, the between-subjects regressions, tell a
similar story (Table 5). Again, job gender has a nonsignificant effect on
both new rates and difference scores. Moreover, holding current rate constant
in the analysis of new rates, market manipulations (both up and down) again
have larger standardized coefficients than their analogous job evaluation
counterparts (market up 6% = .10 vs. job evaluation up = .04; market down
= -.07 vs. job evaluation down = -.05). In addition, the market rate x job
evaluation interaction is again significant. The negative sign indicates
that as market rate and job evaluation points both increase, subjects provided
less-than-additive increments to new pay rates. Thus, this finding is also
consistent with previous analysis of variance results.
Insert Table 5 about here
The regression that included dummy variables for each subject produced
exactly the same significant and nonsignificant effects. As such, those
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findings are not reported here. However, the similarity of results across
equations suggests that autocorrelation does not pose a significant problem
in interpreting the findings reflected in Table 5.
As a further test of the potential influence of job gender on assigned
pay rates, three regressions were run incorporating the gender-dominance
perceptions of subjects involved in the manipulation check. Recall that
the first of these included a variable reflecting perceived "percent male"
for each job, while the latter two reflected the difference in "perceived
maleness" between the jobs in each pair (the first included the job gender
dummy, the second did not). In none of these regressions was the gender-
dominance coefficient significant, again suggesting that perceptions of job
gender were not impacting on results.
Finally, the nine between-subjects regressions for each job pair
(Analysis 4) were examined in terms of job gender, order, rater sex, and
their two- and three-way interactions. (The other variables -- current pay,
market rate, and job evaluation points -- are constants in these analyses).
Of the 63 possible effects (9 equations, 7 effects each), only three
significant effects were found: a rater sex effect for Job Pair 7, a job
gender x rater sex interaction for Job Pair 6, and a job gender x rater sex
x order effect for Job Pair 4. Given that these were significant only at
p < .05, this is the, number of effects that would be expected by chance alone.
Also, keep in mind that in no equation was the main effect for job gender
significant. Therefore, as in preceding analyses, there is no evidence of
of differential pay assignment patterns for job pairs with more strongly
perceived gender-typing on the female jobs.
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Discussion
No matter how the data are analyzed, job gender does not appear to have
systematically affected pay assignments. Ra~her, our subjects appear to
have based their pay decisions on the relevant quantitative data reflecting
job "worth": current pay, market survey rates and job evaluation points.
In this way, our results are similar to those of Grams and Schwab (1985),
Schwab and Grams (1985), and Johnson and Ash (1986), who also found no
evidence of differential decision rules for jobs with varying gender patterns.
In contrast to the only other available study to simultaneously examine
the effects of job evaluation and market surveys on job pay (Doverspike et
al., 1987), present results suggest that market rates are stronger
determinants of job pay than are job evaluation points. It is difficult
to assess the causes of this difference, as Doverspike et al. do not provide
information about how their manipulations were determined. In the present
case, however, the market rate and job evaluation manipulations were carefully
constructed to be both (a) independent of each other and (b) equal in size
(i. e., + / - 6%). As such, we are reasonably confident that our results
reflect the true relative contribution of these factors to subjects' job
pay decisions, at least for these eighteen jobs. In any event, the large
impact of market rates on job pay in this stndy reinforces the need to expand
future job pay research beyond studies of job evaluation alone.
Although the absence of significant effects for job gender is
encouraging, it should be recognized that the possibility of "indirect"
discr~ination still exists (e.g., Schwab & Grams, 1985). That is, to the
extent that either market surveyor job evaluation results themselves reflect
previous discrimination and/or cognitive bias, our results suggest that
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decisions about job pay are likely to incorporate these biases. This
reinforces the need for additional research into the various inputs into
pay decisions, such as job evaluation (see Arvey, 1986) and market surveys
(Rynes & Milkovich, 1986).
We hesitate to place too much emphasis on the few significant
interactions in our study, as the number of effects is only slightly greater
than would be expected by chance alone. Still, we conjecture that most of
our interactions reflect idiosyncratic reactions to particular job pairs.
For example, three of the four significant interactions involve a nonadditive
relationship between market rates and job evaluation points. This
interaction, in turn, appears to be concentrated in a single job pair:
secretary II and security guard. Specifically, subjects did not appear to
give the full pay increment that would be predicted by the +6% (market),
+6% (job evaluation) combination. We believe it is more likely that this
reflects the particular content of these two jobs, rather than any general
tendency to underreward when both pieces of information suggest a job is
underpaid. still, the question is an empirical one that should be examined
in future research.
Again, although we do not wish to make too much of our interactions,
there is at least a hint of potential pay bias against jobs with a heavy
physical content. Specifically, in two of the three-way interactions, jobs
of a physical nature (i.e., equipment mechanic, maintenance mechanic, security
guard, custodian) were given less pay than their "office" counterparts
(editor, interviewer, secretary, clerk typist). Thus, future research might
examine job "physicality", in combination with gender composition, to
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determine whether either, or both, contributes to differential reward
policies.
Of course, to the extent that non-office biases (or any others) exist,
additional research would be necessary to determine the underlying causes.
For example, it may be that white collar staff administrators undervalue
any work that does not take place in office settings. Alternatively, they
may perceive physical laborers as less marketable in today's service economy,
and thus feel less pressure to compensate them generously.
We believe the present research extends previous knowledge in a number
of ways. First, it strongly suggests that factors other than job evaluation
(e.g., current payor market rates) dominate decisions about job pay.
Moreover, it does so in a carefully constructed experiment designed to
facilitate the clear attribution of differences in job pay to specific
sources. As such, present results reinforce recent trends in the literature
to examine determinants of job pay other than job evaluation (e.g., market
surveys, labor market conditions).
Second, the gender manipulation is subtle, relative to much previous
research. Subjects were not asked to explicitly contrast male- or female-
dominated jobs, nor were they provided with explicit gender composition
information. Although some might argue that our manipulation was too subtle,
we believe this to be a less significant problem than gender obtrusiveness
in an era of heightened sensitivity to comparable worth. Moreover, many
of the biases discussed in the job evaluation literature are indeed very
subtle, and hypothesized to operate with only minimal gender cues (see Arvey,
1986; McArthur, 1985). Finally, we performed a wide variety of empirical
tests incorporating the degree of perceived gender dominance, and in no case
The sample represents yet another advantage of the present study.
Present results are based on more than 400 subjects from a wide range of
organizations. This represents a far larger sample size than in previous
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found any relationship between the strength of gender-typing and pay
assignments.
related research (e.g., Schwab & Grams had 103 subjects; Mount & Ellis, 53;
Doverspike et al. had 34, 73, and 197 in their three studies). Moreover,
our power to detect real effects is even further enhanced by the nine repeated
measures per subject (Keppel, 1973), creating a total of 3654 observations.
Additionally, we used actual compensation administrators rather than students
(in contrast to Doverspike, et al., 1987; Grams & Schwab, 1985; and Mahoney
& Blake, 1987). Finally, our subjects had not been explicitly trained in
comparable worth issues (as in Mount & Ellis, 1987), and thus were probably
less likely to consciously try not to discriminate against female-dominated
jobs.
Despite the strengths of the present research, there are also some
potential limitations. For example, although this study moves beyond most
previous research in incorporating additional pay determinants besides job
evaluation, there are still many additional factors that are likely to affect
job pay (e.g., presence or absence of collective bargaining, organizational
culture, business strategy). As such, it would be highly desirable if future
research were to incorporate some of these variables.
Secondly, the present results reflect hyPOthetical, rather than actual,
pay allocation decisions. Therefore, it is possible that these same
administrators might use different models in compensating jobs in their own
organizations. However, some comforting evidence as to the external validity
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of policy capturing techniques is provided by Olson et ale (1987), who showed
that experimentally generated policy-capturing models for a sample of labor
arbitrators were excellent predictors of their arbitral decisions in actual
labor disputes.
Third, the present study matched male- and female-dominated jobs on
the basis of pay rates in the Washington comparable worth study. This raises
two potential objections. First, it could be argued that the jobs might
instead have been matched on job evaluation points (rather than actual pay
rates), and that the resultant pairings would likely have been different.
This is unquestionably true. However, we believe that matching on actual
pay rates was a better choice in terms of producing a credible experimental
task for respondents.
Our logic follows from the fact that pay rates are based on a common
metric (money) that is widely understood across a wide variety of settings.
In contrast, job evaluation systems have unique compensable factors, factor
weights, and point totals, such that any given system produces a somewhat
idiosyncratic point total for any given job. Comparable worth studies have
routinely revealed disparities in assessed "worth" for gender-dominated jobs,
depending on whether worth is measured in terms of current payor job
evaluation points. Thus, it was feared that matching on the basis of job
evaluation points would yield unrealistic market rate manipulations for at
least some of the jobs. These in turn would be more likely to be detected
by compensation administrators than would deviations in job evaluation points,
given the greater generality of monetary (versus job evaluation) metrics.
Nevertheless, future studies matching jobs on evaluation points rather than
current pay would be highly desirable.
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The second potential limitation of matching jobs on Washington study
pay rates is that these rates may not be perfectly representative of 1986
national rates. Although this is certainly the case, the main requirement
for the present study is that the stated rate for each job be realistic enough
to be credible to compensation administrators. We believe our data satisfy
this requirement, as there were no objections to the pay rates in either
of our pretests (where we specifically asked for examples of problematic
manipulations), or in the experiment itself. Also, as indicated earlier,
Washington pay rates were themselves based on salary surveys covering other
states, and relative pay for jobs and occupations has been quite stable over
time.
Unfortunately, any study that attempts to determine the influence of
job gender on job pay is likely to be confonnded by the fact that, in reality,
men and women tend to hold different jobs in our economy. Therefore, no
single study can deal with all the potential problems that arise in attempting
to determine the effects of gender, holding other factors constant, because
other factors (e.g., job content) are not constant. Consequently, progress
in this area must be made through a series of studies, where subsequent
research improves upon the limitations of earlier efforts.
A number of general research directions would be useful in extending
the results of this, and previous, studies. First, additional factors
believed to influence job pay (e.g., collective bargaining, business
environment) need to be studied in conjunction with the present variables.
Second, in-depth studies of pay determination in single organizations are
needed, given that additional variables (as well as more detailed information
about the present ones) undoubtedly shape organizational pay structures (see
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also Hartmann, 1985; Schwab & Grams, 1985). Finally, at the risk of
triggering comparable worth reactivity among subjects, studies that examine
how pay is determined across jobs of varying gender compositions
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study Design: Job Pairs (in order of presentation), CUrrent Pay, Job Evaluation
Baseline, and Market and Job Evaluation Manipulations
Job Pair
1. Secretary II

































































No Change: Job evaluation points were within +/-2% of baseline; Market rate
was within +/- 2% of current rate.
$ 1690 680 $1590
(-6%)
** Job Evaluation Base = Salary Midpoint x .4.
Table 2
Summary of Analyses
Analysis Dependent Independent Variables
Variable
1. Mixed Analysis of New Rate Between Subjects:
Variance: minus Job Gender
Current Rate Order




2. Mixed Analysis of Percent Change: Between-Subjects:
Variance:













(Table 2 continued on next page)
4. Nine Between-Subjects
OLS Regressions:
(One for each job





(3 dummies, 1 omitted)
Job Evaluation







Analysis of Variance Results: Analyses 1 and 2
Source df F-Value F-Value
(Analysis 1) (Analysis 2)
Between-subjects
Job Gender 1 .31 .29
Order 1 2.42 2.47
Rater Sex 1 .22 .23
JG x 0 1 .00 .02
JG x RS 1 .00 .00
0 x RS 1 .00 .00




Market Rate 2 330.84** 358.22**
Job Evaluation 2 32.92** 40.10**
MRxJE 4 15.19** 6.07**
'-ffi.x JG 2 1.56 1.34
MR x 0 2 .67 .93
MR x RS 2 1.18 1.40
MR x JG x 0 2 1.88 1.34
MR x JG x RS 2 1.05 1.51
MR x 0 x RS 2 .06 .06
MR x JG x RS x Q 2 .40 .57
(Table 3 continued on next page)
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JE x JG 2 .03 .02
JE x 0 2 .03 .13
JE x RS 2 1.80 2.59
JE x JG x 0 2 3.10* 3.04*
JE x JG x RS 2 .54 .65
JE x 0 x RS 2 .26 .26
- -
JE x JG x RS x 0 2 .57 .62
MR x JE x JG 4 2.59* 2.54*
MRxJExO 4 .31 .29
MR x JE x RS 4 2.02 2.68*
MR x JE x JG x 0 4 .35 .48
MR x JE x JG x RS 4 .90 1.03
MR x JE x RS x 0 4 1.22 1.51
MR x JE x RS x 0 x JG 4 1.58 1.16
-
MSE: (MR) 796 (7465) ( .003)
MSE: (JE) 796 (9176) ( .003)
MSE: (MR x JE) 1592 (5769) ( .002)
*
p < .05
** p < .01
Market Manipulation
Down 6% No Change Up 6%
Job Evaluation
Manipulation
Down 6% -28.8 4.3 69.5
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Table 4
Cell Means Illustrating the Market Rate x Job Evaluation Interaction:
Analysis 1
No Change -11.2 26.3 97.3
Up 6% 9.9 58.3 76.9
Standardized Standardized
Coefficient: Coefficient:














Analysis 3: Between-Subject Regressions on New Rate and Percent Change











Market Rate x Job Evaluation
Adjusted R2: .88 .11
*
Significant at p < .01
